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Abstract
Sequential innovation with actual patent infringement and uncertainty in litigation is analyzed.
Comparative statics shows that within a wide range of model parameters, a basic researcher holding a
patent is able to extract all the profit facililated by the basic innovation. The patent holder achieves
this by offering a licencing contract which the subsequent innovator accepts. It is further demonstrated
that under rather general circumstances, broader patent breadth may diminish the patent holder's
chance to achieve the desired equilibrium outcome: that is to extract all the profit from the subsequent
innovator marketing the product.
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Center for Economic Research (CentER) at Tilburg University.I. Introduction
1
The design of an optimal patent syatem óas re-emerged recently as the aubject of economic inquiry.
An intriguing fact is that the patent law doea not and, perhaps, cannot circumacribe ita objects,
iadividual patents, in a preciae and unquestionable way. For inatance, the most important statutory
criteria tot patentability ate "novelty' and "nonobviouaness". Novelty can be interpreted as the
criterion to deurmine whether the new invention wae not in "prior art", i.e., whether the inventor óas
really invented something. The nonobviousneas criterioo exclude~ patentability of inventions for which
it ie "obvious" that they could be invented with sufficient eRort, even though no one has bothered to
do so so far. Intringement ot patent can be generally defined as the nonsanctioned manufacture, use,
making or sale of an invention for which a valid patent has been issued. Typically, infringement
constitutes a situation where a new invention significantly overlaps with the patented technology.
Signiócant overlap in turn ia determined again in terms of novelty and nonobviousness - which are
subject to qualification and interpretation. Therefore, legal determination of infringement can be a
ditLcult lask. [t ie not too far-fetched to imagine a complicated infringement case where the legal
institutions ate incapable of eound judgment.l
One typical aspect of RkD 'u that a commercially protitable innovation results from basic research.
Brosdly apeaking, basic research can be generated by individual researchers, independent reaesrch
institutiona sucó as universities, or industrial reaearch laboratories. A rather unanticipated fact that has
been noted by Jewkes et al. (1969) in their case study of seventy signi6cant inventions is that more
than one hal( of them could be attributed to individual inventors who had no capacity in
commercializing their achievements. Thus the distribution of profit between basic researchera without
directly marketable products and the vendors of marketable products derived from the basic technology
should be of utmost importance and interest to economists. To illustrate, Robert W. Kearns, a former
engineering protesaor who patented his intermittent wiper system in 1967, was awarded back royalties
of 510.2 million in a settlement with Ford Motor Company in 1990 and 311.3 million by Federal Court
in his patent infringing case against Chrysler Corporation in 1992. He has also sued the Genetal Motors
Corporation, the Toyota Motor Corporation, Fiat S.p.A and most large Japanese car manufacturers.~
1Dreyfuss (1989)- "In general, the cowt (Court of ApDeals for the Federal Circuit, the sDecialized
cowt established in 198Y to focus on patent jurisdiction) has been successful with issues like obviousness...
issues that arise mainly in enforument Droceedings have not been nearly as well exDlicated.... (the court) Das
yet to announu Uear tests for many of the issues involved in the infringement question." For instance, when
asked to determine whether certain miniaturized calculators infringed Teaas Instrument's pioneering
calculator Datent, the CAFC contradicted its statements Dy (rst recognizing significance of "Dioneer status"
of the patent but later reXCting the aDDlication of [he doctrine of equivalents wbich favors the Datentee in
Tesu Iwar.mewa, lwc. ~. Unitr! Stdn Iwte.wsGo..l Ts1e Commiuios (Federal Cireuit, 1986). For a discussion
of the case in detail, see also Merges and Nelson (1990).2
Theae impnsaive episodes ahould not divert our attention from the fact that, as a rule, technological
advancement nowadaya demanda more than juat an ingeniously novel idea; that availability of
eophiaticsted laboratory equipment and a subatantial capital inveatmeot may alao be eaeential.
Neverthelese, companiea and reaearcó inatitutiona hsve realiud by now that it can be profitable to aue
for patent infringement for products they óold the patenta to, but which they have never produced,
never intended to produce, sometimes eveo considered non-producible or non-marketable. In a recent
case involving commercial companies, Procter át Gamble sued Whitehall Laboratories and its parent,
American Home Producta Corporation over the cold remedy with ibuprofio although P.kG. óas never
had a product of this kind. Adopting aimilar strategies, Honeywell Inc. won a big patent case in 1992
agaimt Minolta Camera Company of Jepan over the auto-focua rwrrtera lena, a technology floneywell
never itself developed commercially.3 lowa State University, in yet aoother instance where independent
research institutiona try to claim the intellectual property right, was able to collect licensing fees ot up
to S18 million from Sharp Corp. of ]apan, NEC Corp., and Canon Inc. in 1992 on its 1973 patent
covering an encoding process in the fax machine.4 Most research universities do have procedures and
personnel to file patent applications and deal with licensing agreements as well as infringement suits.
Despite the economic significance of cumulative innovation, plausible theoretical models related to
this iaaue are atill rare. An exception ia Green and Scotchmer (1995). They address the iasue of optimal
patent breadth and duration, and the role of different legal mechanisms when innovation takes place in
two stages. The authors argue that the potential patent holder may lack incentives to invest in the fvst
place, because not all the aocial value tacilitated by basic research can be transferred from the second
generation products. In their paper as in ours, quality improvement is the only indicator for patent
protection and infringement.5 Moreover, we are concerned with the division ot profit due to imperfect
patent protection. By imperfect patent protection we mean here that the outcome of infringement
litigation is uncertain. Indeed, both parties may agree privately whether or not an infringement occurs.
Yet the court may come to a ditierent conclusion.
25ee Kew Yo.k Timr~. June 12, 1992.
35ee Edmund l Andrews, ,h'rw York Timu, Nov. 9, 1992 for these and other examples.
,See Wall Strert Josrwal, Oct. 12. 1992.
sin general, however, this need not De the case. Development can occur in one or more of the many
dimensions of product characteris[ics. With heterogeneous consumers, it may be impossiDle t0 single out an
unamDiguous direction of Quality imDrovement. For instance, motivateO by Klemperer's (í990) product
variety model, t-erner (1991) develoDS a Droxy fo. Datent scoDe baud on the International Patent
Classification scneme which is more in parallel to the conceDt of Droduct differentia[ion.3
Qyi p~jn tonclusion !e ~~ verv q~~y ~ i' a uatent holder mav yp~, jg~ incentivex ~Q invest ip
basic rc ip t t ~ nlace! We arrive at this conclusion by identitying conditions on the
probability of winning infringement litigation that guatantee the pnknt óolder extraction of all the
profit by offering a licencing contract to the eub~eequent innovator which the latter accepta. Our rather
optimistic conclusion contrasta with the more peeaimistic tenor of Green and Scotchmer (1995) who
investigate the etficacy of varioua policies intended to insure that the patent holder receives a large
enougó proft share.
To put our contribution into broader context, we distinguish between two etrands of literature related
to patent protection: the "tencepost" system literature and the "signpost" syatem literature. Adopting
the fencepost interpretation of paknt scope, Hortemaon et al. (1985) look at paknts as information
transfer mechanism and assume "limited but exact pateot coverage". Within the second strand of
literature, Waterson (1990) looks at uncertainty in paknt infringement litigation from a dillerent angle
and develops a model where like in ours the concept of "limited but inexact patent coverage" is
employed. Whereas we explicitly require concavity of the patent holder's winning probability, he
implicitly impoaes an equivalent property on the "court cost function" defining litigation catsts and
damage fees awarded to the patent holder. While Wateraon is primarily concerned with the impact ot
patent protection on product variety - and the implied consumer welfare - in a horizontal product
differentiation model, our emphasis lies on appropriability and incentives to innovate in a vertical
product differentiation model with sequentialinnovation.
The paper is organized as follows. [n Section 2, we speciCy a model to be used to inveatigate the
division of pro~t between an initial patent holder with no marketing power and a subsequent innovator
o( a derived product. For simplicity we assume that after the first innovation is made, the idea for each
derivative improvement occurs to only one firm which is uniquely capable of developing it at a given
cost. As advertised above, we show that under some circumstances the patent holder collects all the
profit fazilitated by its basic rcsearch. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the latter outcome
suggest a simple intuitive explanation why patent holders tend to chase afkr those subsequent
innovators whose producta are sufrciently novel and highly pro6table. Section 3 is devoted to
comparative statics. One salient feature unearthed in the course of this investigation is the fazt that the
motion to postpone a patent infringement suit may have strategic reasons. The long lasting Intel-AMD
suit over microprocessors and the recent Kodak-Sony patent dispute constitute typical examples.b
Several concluding remarks are made in Section 4. The more technical or elaborate proots are collected
in an Appendix.
óFOr Cetatls, see Efrctronic Nrws, Nov 22. 1993 anC Wnlf Strert Joarnal, March 23, 1994.4
H. The Model
There are one reaearch inatitution and one firm. The reaearcó inatitutíon is called the patent holder
(PH) hereafter. It has acquired a patent on its inventioo with quality x. We set x- 0 without la~ss of
generality. The patent breadth granted is y'. Quality x is just a basic reaearch outcome and óas no
market value per ee. The firm is capable of developing a new product of quality y with x C y G y' so
that it would surely infringe on the patent held by PH. The coet of developing quality y is cy. Once
developed, the new product can be produced at zero cost and has market value xy.
The crucial elements of patent litigation cm be deacribed as follows: Each party incurs the same
litigation coat G 1 0. There is an objective probability f(y) of PH wioning in litigation. The existence
of such an f(y) can be defended on the grounds that there is no perfect patent protection due to the
nature of current patent law and the process of infringement litigation. While both parties may agree
privately whether or not an infringement occurs, the court may come to a diRerent conclusion.
Occasionally, we treat y as variable and f(y) as a decreasing function of y E[O,y'] with f(0) - 1 and
i(y') - 0. The further away trom x a new invention is, the less likely is a verdict ot infringement.
We model the strategic interaction as a strateeic g.ame between PH and the firm. The game lasts
ooe period which is defined as the time interval beginning when PH makes the licensing offer and
ending when the in(ringement issue is resolved. The two players take several steps during the period.
There is no discounting within the period.
Both players enter the game with exogenously given and commonly known y. PH, as a first
mover, makes a licensing agreement o(fer simply by specifying R with RE [O,oo). We view R as a
Gxed-fee royalty: The number R represents the amount to be paid by the firm for the right to market
its product. By offering R-O, PH tolerates the infringement without legal recourse. Facing the offer,
the firm has three strategic alternatives: (i) quit the project; (ii) pay the royalty proposed by PH; (iii)
challenge the patent infringement allegation. ln the latter contingency, PH has to make one more
move: take no action or litigate. ln accordance with U.S. practice, we assume that even if ít loses, the
firm retains the profit from marketing this application while paying its litigation costs plus back
royalties. Figure 1 summarizes the extensive fo~ of the game, showing the order of decisions and ehe
resulting (expected) payoffs.
(Figure 1 aóoul Aere]
Set M-{No-action, Litigation} and N-{Take-it, Leave-it, Drop-out}. Then the normal fplrr~ of
the game has strategy spaces SPH-Rx)11R for PH and SF-NR for the firm. We consider strategy pairs
that are Nash equilibria, i.e. each player chooses a strategy that maximizes its expected payoff given5
the other player's atrategy. Moreover, we require subaame ner(ection: Equilibrium paira of strategiea
induce equilibrium play in all subgamea.
We distinguish four typee of purc strategy equilibria. Which typra oaur, dependa on the
numerical apecification of the model.
1. The Takcit eauilibrium ie characterized by an R, with
xr-cr-R, ~0,
xr - cr - Ri ? xr - cr - f(Y)R~ - L, and
f(y)R, - L ~ 0.
The firm responds with Talce-it to this offer. Should the firm play Leave-it in response to this ofier,
then PH would counter with Litigation.
2. The eav 't eyuilibrium is characterized by an oRer R, with
xr - cr - f(Y)R, - L 1 0,
xr-cr-f(y)R,-L ~ ar-cr-R„and
f(y)R, - L ~ 0.
The firm responds with Leave-it to this oller and PH counters with Litigation.
3. The No-Action eauilibrium is characterized by an oller R„ with
f(y)R., - L ~ 0, and
wr - cr 1 0.
The firm responds with Leave-it to this o(fer and PH counters with No-action.
4. The o t eonilibrium is characterized by an offer Rd with
xr - cY - Rd G O,
f(y)Rd - L 1 0, and
xr - cr - f(Y)Rd - L G 0.
The firm responds with Drop-out to this oRec Should the firm respond with Leave-it to this oRer,
then PH would counter with Litigation.
PA, as a leader in this game, has the sole interest in manipulating the offer R so as to collect the
highest possible profit share from the firm. Therefore we will not pursue any further the No-Action and6
Drop-out equilibria where PH cannot generate any positive gain.~
We proceed witó the following simplifying assumption:
(A1) a'y - a.y, cy - c.y where a and c are constants satisfying a~ c~ 0.
A constant marginal revenue occurs in a standard vertical (quality) ditTerentiation problem. There
consumers have utility functions of the form U- 9y - P where A ie a taste parameter and P is the
price charged tor the product of quality y. The distribution of tastes acroas consumers is given by the
uniform distribution on the interval [B', B) with 1 1 B' ~ 0 and B-8'}1. Then, given y, the firm
B~
maximiaes ita groas profit by choosing the price level Py -~. The resulting gross proftt is xy - Y4 '
Put a- 82~4.
We firet explore the poaeibility that ~F ca~ px[ract all t e urofit from the firm, i.e., where an offer
R,-(a-c)y geu accepted in equilibrium. Neceasary and sufficient conditions for sucó an equilibrium
outcome are described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. PH can extract all the profit it facilitates from the Cirm if and only if
(a) Y- Yf(Y) C áL~ and
(b) Yf(Y) ? a~~




t(y)R, - L ~ 0.
With the previous specification, they are equivalent to:
R~ 5 (a - c)Y~ (1)
R~ ~ I- ~y')'
and (z)
(3)
~In a more comDlicated many-fvm setting, however, these Dotential tyDes of epuilibria may
significantly imDact uDOn PH's decision-making.7
Now assume (1) with equality. Then (2) and (3) are equivalent to
Y(1 - t(Y)] G ~ and
Yt(Y) ? ~E~
(4)
Some aimple comparative statics can help develop intuition for this result. First of all, suppoac a, c, y,
and L are given such that y 7~~ and f(y) is treated as a variable. Then (4) and (5) are
simultaneously satisfied if and only if f(y) is su[ficiently large. This wn be seen from the game tree in
Figure 1. To achieve a Takeit equilibrium with R-(a - c)y, PH's threat of litigation in case the C~rm
rejects the otfer has to be credible, that is, f(y)-R-L ~ 0. If y 7 ~ or, equivalently, (a - c)y 7 L
and if R-(a-c)y, then the inequality f(y)R - L 7 0 holds trivially [or f(y)-1. By continuity, a óigó and
only a higó winning probability f(y) helps PH achieve the licensing agreement where the órm obtains
zero payoff. Uore specifically, we observe that (a)n(b) implies f(y)~~.
Oo the other hand, when a, c, y, and L are given with y G(a~ c), the situation changes drastically.
Whereas ( a) is always satisfied under this assumption, (b) breaks down tor all f(y) E(0,1J. Thus there
does no longer exist the Take-it equilibrium PH is longing for. It is obvious Crom the game tree that
PH is seriously concerned about the potential loss from litigation and theretore takes no action even if
the firm dares to infringe.e Under this particular specification, a smaller y doea not benefit PH in
achieving its goal of exploiting the firm - even with a high winning probability. To sum up, the
preceding comments suggest there might exist lower and upper bounds for those y which permit the
type of Take-it equilibrium in question.
To extend the analysis one step Curther and arrive at such bounds, we next consider a situation with
exogenously given L, a, c, y', and a function f: (0, y'] ~-- [0, 1] satisfying:
(A2) f(0) - 1, f(y') - 0, and f is twice di(Terentiable with fc 0, far G 0.
BThis could exDlam why some PHS never pother to file suit against the manufacturers of low-tech
clones, targetinq instead those subser,uent Drominent manufacturvs whose Droducts are sufficiently novel and
making signiRcant proflt.8
It is natural to assume f to be decreasing. It also appenrs plausible that PH's winning probability
drops faster as y movea further away from x-0, or the more y approaches the delimiter of patent
protection, y'. From a diRetent perspective, cetens parióra, the firm ia enjoying "increasing returns to
litigation" ae y variee.
We perform comparative statics witó respect to yE(O,y']. For thia purpose, we introduce the functions
g1(Y) - Y(1 - f(Y)]
and
g2(Y) - Yf(Y),
~rhich appcar in (4) and (5) and, obviously, play a critical role in our analysis. Notice that
g1~-l-f-y.f~ 0 and gl~r--2[-y.f ~ 1 0 in the interval (O,y'). Hence gl is strictly increasing and
strictly convex in y with gl(0)-0 and gl(y')-y'. Further notice that g2t-(y.f)r-ffy.tr and
g2r~-(y.f)r-2f ty.[rGO. Thus g2 is strictly concave in y with g2(0)-g2(y')-0. Consequently, g2 has
a unique maximizer y in (O,y'). This maximizer is given as the unique solution of the first order
condition
62r(Y)-f(Y) f Y'~(Y) - 0.
Finally, let y denote thc'median' of f, i.e. y is implicitly given by the condition
f(Y ) - ~.
Lemma 1. y C y and 0 G y'~? G y G y'.
Propoeition 2. Suppose
(c) Yf(Y) ? a~.
Then there exiat yi, y, with the (ollowing properties:
(i) 0 G Y~ S Y~ G Y~:
(ii) PH can extract all the profit it facilitates (rom the firm iff y E(y~, y.].
Having arrived at these conclusions, one still has to be very cautious in interpreting Propositions I
and 2. First of all, the Take-it equilibrium described in the propositions is of a particular kind where an
otfer R~ - (a - c)y gets accepted in equilibrium. When condition (c) holds as a strict inequality and y
lies in the interval (y„ y,), there ir always su[ficient slack Cor a Take-it equilibrium with
R~ G(a - c)y.9 In other words, not all Take-it equilibria guarantee 100 per cent profit transfer.
Secondly, one should wonder if a Take-it equilibrium guarantees the highest profit that PH can earn,
since R~, the offer made in a Leave-it equilibrium could well be above (a - c)y. To clari(y that matter,
we present the following proposition.9
Propoeition 3- Suppose (c) holda and PA ia confronted witó yE[yl,yr]- Then the Tako-it equilibrium
with R;- (a- c)y generates the higheat poesible equilibrium payoíT for PH.
proof: By Proposition 2 we know that [y„ y,] is a nonempty xt when condition (c) in satisGed-
Moreover, PA is capable ot achieving the Take-it equilibrium in whicó the otfer R-(a - c)y geta
accepted and, óence, (a - c)y constitutm PA's equilibrium payofi. By (A1), the latter ie guaranteed to
be greater than the payotfa that can be obtained via a Drop-out or a No-Action equilibrium. On the
other ósnd, a Leave-it equilibrium ia subject to the following qualifiutions:
xy - cv - f(Y)Rr - L ~ 0,
xr-cy-f(y)R,-L 1 xy-cy-R„and
f(Y)R, - L ~ 0.
With the previous speciC~cation, these are equivalent to:
(a - c)y - f(y)R, - L ? 0,
[1 - f(y)]R, - L 7 0, and




Even if a Leave-it equilibrium exists for some y E(y„y.], the corresponding expected payoff for PA is
at most f(y)R, - L. From (6) we can infer the tollowing inequality:
f(y)R, - L ~ f(y)R, f L ~(a - c)y. ao
It is also clear from the foregoing proof that a Leave-it equilibrium would always generate a profit
less than (a - c)y for PA. This observation combined with the assertion of Proposition 3 justifies our
9Namely, in the Droof of ProDOSition 2. the bounds yl and yr are constructed such that y E(Yr. Y.)
and yf(y) ~ a~ c imDly y1(y) 1 a ~ c or (a - c)y ~ r~y) which in turn imDlies that [f~Y), ( a - c)y) is nei[her
the empty set nor a singleton. Therefore there eYists R, ~(a - c)y, say, R, -(a - c)y - e where f is a small
positive number, such that conditions ( 1), (2) and ( 3) are simultaneously satisfied.10
almost exclusive focus on the propertiea of the completrprofit-transter Take-it equilibrium.
It is obvious that our conclusiom about the distribution of profit rely crucially on condition (c). The
mathematical interpretation of (c) is etraightforward:
MaxrE(o r.( g~(Y) - btaxrE(rn r.] BzÍY) ?~E~
The economic meaning of (c) is somewhat more subtle than that. Aiming at complete exploitation of
the firm, PH óss to balance two factore moving in oppoeite directions: what the firm is capable of, i.e.,
the magnitude of y, and how signifiunt the chance is that he can win the infringement cave, i.e., the
range of f(y). More specifically, while making a higher o(ier to cope with a higher y, PH strives to
maintain a credible threat to avoid the opportunism o( the firm as f(y) declines. Under condition (c),
PH msstere this balancing act and extracts all profit.
So far we have ahown in the previoun propositions that PH is capable of achieving a Take-it
equilibrium by offering a licenaing agreement that traosfere the entire profit (a - c)y [rom the firm
when condition (c) is satisfied. Thie outeome would provide PH the maximal incentive to invent under
the specification of our model. Meanwhile, PH's payoti from this type of agreement is always greater
than that from a Leave-it equilibrium - even if the Iatter is feaaible.
III. Comparative Statica
In this section we focus on the comparative statics with respect to several key variables - within
their most interesting range in our set-up. [n the sequel we denote t- y,-y„ the length of the interval
of y where a Take-it equilibrium with all the pro6t being transferred can be obtained. We 6rst
investigate how t is responding to variations of the litigation cost L, the gross profit parameter a, and
the product development cost parameter c. It suffices to see how t depends on the compound
parameter k- ~.
Lemma 2. Suppose ~~ yf(y), then ~ G 0 for k E 2, yf(y)). Moreover, the corresponding intervals
(YI(k)~Yr(k)] are strictly nested.ll
Intuitively, a higher litigation wet ahould have a stronger threatening etTect on the firm who takes a
chance when turning down the offer, since it will face a higher expected lom once it loeea. However,
Lemma 2 says that even when the litigation cost ie in the "favorable" range where a complete-profit-
transfer via a Take-it equilibrium can be aseured, óigher litigation cost will damage the manipulative
power of PH.lo What we obxrve is that whea k rixs above ~ while staying below the bound yf(y),
g7(y) etarts to effectively determine the boundaries of L. Therefore the senaitivity of t(k) with respect
to k depends only on the strict concavity of gz(y). Recall that g~(y) j k is esxntially the same as
condition (3), R~ f~. It u then obvioua that a higher L makea it harder to aatufy (3). A similar
interpretation can be applied to the parametets a and c.
Lemma 3. t(k) is strictly concave in k and there exists a unique k E(0, ~) such that
t(k) 1 t(k) for all k E R..
Lemmata 2 and 3 convey a complete picture of the comparative atatirs with respect to k. It is
obvious that the convexity (concavity) of gt (gz) plays a crucial role here. Thia property followa
directly from the concavity of f(y), the probability of PH winning in litigation.
In a eecond type of comparative statics, we investigate how 1, the leng:h of the interval where PH
can extract all the surplus, is affected by a change of patent protection. Intuition may suggeat that the
best way to help PH transfer profit Crom the firm is to grant PH a broad patent protection.
Intriguingly enough, this is a premature conclusion as the next proposition showa. One more
simplifying assumption, (A3) is imposed to establish the result. Prior to that we have to extend the
model appropriately by postulating that f takes the more general form f(y; y'), OGyGy', where the
patent breadth y'~ 0 is treated as variabte in the sequel. The obvious notation L(k; y'), k(y'), etc.
will be used.
(A3) t(y; y') - f(y.; 1), i.e., f(y; y') is homogeneous of degree 0.
10Although not sDecifically modeled here, a longer litigation Drocess can also De viewed as increasing
litigation costs. Therefore a motion to postDOne a patent infringement suit may have strategic reasons.12
(A3) stipulates that the winning probability for PH depeoda only on the ratio y~y', not on the
abeolute magnitude of y or y'. An extremely high y' might correspond to a very vague claim such as
"All non-human transgenic mammals" or "All óaod-ttx calculaton."ii The broader tbe patent
protection, the easier is it for an allegedly infringing firm to challenge the patent claim. ln a model
witó merely one-dimensional quslity choice, imposing (A3) constitutes a simple attempt to capture
that aspect of reality. (AS) has several immediate consequences:
Lemma 4. The functiona yl(k;y'), yr(k;y'), and t(k;y') are homogeneous of degree 1 in (k;y'). The
functions y(y') and y(y') are homogeneous of degree 1 in y'.
Let us [irst atate a result that conforms to intuition: Aa patent protection becomes broader, t(k; y')
increasea, i.e. the size of the interval where PH can extract all the surplus increases.
Propoeition ~. The following three assertions hold:
(I) ~t(k;y') is atrictly increasing in y' ~ 0 as long as 0 G k G y(y')~2.
(II) t(k;y') is strictly increasing in y' ) 0 as long as 0 G k G Y(Y')~2.
(III) k(y') is atrictly increasing in y' ~ 0.
Let us now proceed to the promised, somewhat lesa intuitive reault: As patent protection becomes
broader, the relative size of the interval where PH can extract all the surplus may decrease.
Propositioo 5. For any 0 G y~ G y", there exists rc(y', y") 1 0 such that
t(k; Y..) G t(k; Y.) for all 0 G k G rc(Y~, Y~~).
Y~ Y~
Proposition 5 atates that even though t(k, y') increases as patent protection becomes broader, t~y' ,
that is the relative size of the interval where PH can extract all the surplus, may be falling for certain
k. The manipulative power of PH measured as the fraction ot infringing y that provide maximal
incentive to PH to innovate, can apparently diminish when the government institutes broader
protection. Let us briefly explain how monotonicity, concavity and homogeneity of f can lead to such a
conclusion. Homogeneity of degree zero of f(y; y') yields homogeneity o( degree one of t(k; y'). The
llSee U.S. Patent No. 1.736,866, ittued Apr. 12, 1988. Thit patent it granted to Doctort Philip
l.eder and Timotny Stewart of Ihe Harvard Medical School Ior their successful work on trantgenic mice. For
the hand-held calcula[ors cate. see Tuu Ixctramcwt~ Iwc. ~. Uwitel Stwlu Iwtersatiowd Treie Commi~~iow
(Federal Circuit 1986.)13
impact of higher y' on the rstio L~y' ia then immediate, aince t(k; y')~y' can be reduced to
L(k~y';1). Moreover, f(y; y') strictly decreasing and strictly concave in y implies that t(k; y') is
strictly increasing and etrictly conuve in kGk. Thus for fued k, the normalised t(y ; 1) is greater
than the normalized t( 1;,; 1).
Y
j}'- Concludine liemarkn
We have studied the division of pro6t between a patent holder and a derived product producer in an
environment with uncertainty about the outcome of infringement litigation. Comparative statics with
respect to several key parameten has been performed. Our analysia identifies the conditiona on model
parametere which permit a complete-profit-transfer equilibrium.
To reiterate, we have highlighted some of the most important differences between the "signpost" and
"fencepost" interpretation of the patent system. ln particular, the elements of uncertainty and
conuvity in the probability distributioo function play prominent roles io arriving at conclusions that
are quite different trom those obtained by Green and Scotchmer (1995) for a similarly constructed
quality improvement game. They claim that in general not all the profit csn be transferred to the first
innovator and therefore the patents should last longer when a acquence ofinnovations is undertaken by
different firms. Their conclusion of profit erosion is derived primarily Crom the bargaining power of the
second innovator whose threat of not bringing the product to market strengthens his position in the
negotiation process. Extending their game one more stage further into the post-marketing period and
addressing the issue of stochastic outcomes in litigation, we try to accomplish a better approximation
o! the current patent practice. By committing to the credible threat of court action, our PH enjoys the
advantage ot a first-mover with the occasional opportunity of extracting all the profit accruing to the
second generation product. As a consequence, proposals to increase patent length in order to enhance
incentives for basic research look less attractive for a"signpost" system of patents like ours.
As for the optimal patent breadth, Green and Scotchmer present a special case in which unlimited
patent protection may not be optimal when the uncertainty on the exact development y is not resolved.
In a quite ditferent context, we arrive at another refutation of the argument that broader patent
breadth unconditionally makes PH better off. However, unlike theirs our conclusion is not derived from
uncertainty in development, but rests on a homogeneity assumption which renders the relative
improvement measure y~y' a main determinant of transferability of profit from the firm to the patent
holder.14
We believe that introducing uncertainty of the outcome of a patent infringement suit enriches and
furthers the economic understanding of current patent aystenu. It opena a multi-facet, widely
unexplored reswch area of la~v and economiu. Severa! elementa might be added to our model: for
inatance, endogenous choice of y and y'; informstional esymmetries diacussed in the recent licensing
literature (Gallini and Wright, 1990) and litigation literature (Bebchuk, 1984; Meurer, 1989;
Reinganum and Wilde, 1986); ditierent liability rules adopted by other countries; competition between
PH and firm(s); etc.
There is certainly an element of uncertainty that we intentionally ignore in the present formal
anslysis, concerning the allocation of litigation costs. As Dreyfuas (1989) pointa out, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit - the specialízed court eatablished in 1982 to focus on patent
jurisdiction - haa failed to clarify the law on pecuniary damages.12 However, in our model we assume
the smallest conceivable damages for PH: the licensing fee he is as{cing for. Given that PH can only do
better under the prevalent practice, our qualitative results in favor of PH persist. Yet another
qualification could be that outrageous licensing fee requests are corrected downward by the court or
affect negatively f, the probability of winning litigation.
12The Patent Act permi[s tne court to treDle Ne damayes. 35 U.S.C. 5 284 (1982). and to award
attorney's fees and Cost in "exceDtional cases" 35 U.S.C. 5 285. These enhanced damages are [yD~cally
awarded to Denalize willful misbehavior. For e:ample, Triarth Industries won treDle damages against Trans
Global Imports (TAr Weekly Nomr Frrnukrnr~ Nrrrqqrr, Feb 21, 1994) and Exxon CorD. won award of S18
million in attorney's fees in its infringement case against Lubrizol CorD (WaII SO.rr1 Jo~rn~l, Feb. 19. 1993.)APPENDIX
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Proot 4{ Lemma 1: Recall that g2(Y) ia strictly concave in y witó g2(0) - 0 and g2(Y') - 0. By
Talcayama(1985) Theorem 1.C.3: f is concave on (0, y') if and only if for any x, y E(0, y'):
f(Y)'(x - Y) ? f(x) - f(Y).
Evaluate this inequality at y-'y and let x- 0. Then
-~(Y)~Y ~ 1 - ~ or [(Y)'Y G -~.
Adding f(y)- ~ to the latter inequality yields
g2t(Y) -Y~~(Y) t f(Y) G 0.
Strict concavity of g2 and g2~(y) - 0 imply the assertioo y G y. Further, (A2) has the immediate
implication 0 G y'~2 G y G y'. OO
Proof qj Prooosition ~: R.ecall that g~(y) is atrictly increasing and strictly convex in y with g~(0) - 0
and 6i(Y~) - Y~. BYPothesia (c) amounts to g2(Y) ~ g~.
Part (i):
g2(y) achieves íta maxímum at y where g2~(y) - f(y) f yf(y) - 0. By the hypothesis, the continuity
and other properties of g2, and the intermediate value theorem, there exist z~E(0, y] and z,E[y, y')
such that gZ(y) ~ gZ(z~) - gZ(z,) - a~ c. If (c) holds with equality, then z~ - z, - y. If (c) holds
with strict inequality, then z~ G y G z,.
Next note that (c) implies y' ~ g2(y) ~~f ~ 0. Then, by the continuity and other properties of
gl and the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique zE(O,y') with gt(z) -~. To corppare
the magnitudes o( z~ and z, we consider two subcases.
Subcax (i-a): y~2 ~ a~ c. Now by definition, f(y) - 2 and therefote ~ G y~2 c g~(y) - g2(y~).
Therefore, y E[zt, z,], by the strict concavity of g2. Also, z~ y, by the stricó monotonicity ot gl. Hence
z C z,. Moreover, 0- gl(0) - g2(0), ~.y - gt(y) - g2(y), strict convexity of gt and strict concavity
of g2 implY g1(Y) G g'Y G 62(Y) for YE(~, y'). lf y"-t~, then z-y-z1. If y~ z„ then gl(z~) G g2(z~) -
a~. Thus z~ zi. In any case, therefore, zE[z~, z,]. ~
Subcase (i-b): y~2 G gLc. Then y~[z~, t,] and z~ y. By Lemma 1, y~ y 1 z~. Thus z 1 z~. .
Now set y~ - z~ and y.- min(z„ z]. Then (i) is satisfied.ls
Part (ii):
We commence witó the aufliciency proof. When condition (c) holda and y E[y„ y.], then y E[z„ :,]
and the strict concavity of gz implies (b) yf(y) ~ -~-~ - Further y E [y~, y.] impliea yGz. Since gt(y)
is an increaeing function in y E[0, Y'], coodition (a) YIl - t(Y)] 5~ óolds ae well.
Now we turn to the necmeity proof. (b) implies that y E[z„ s.]. (a) implid that y G z. Together (a)
and (b) imply y E[z~, min{z„ z}] - [y„ y.]. Note that we know from Propoaition 1 that by offering
R, -(a - c)y, PH can extract all the profit it facilitates from the firm if and only it (a) and (b) both
óold. We have shown that under the hypothesis (c), the combination of (a) and (b) is equivalent to
y E[y„ y.]. Thie completee the proof. O
Proof gj Lemma ~: Suppox a, q y, and f(y) are given such that k E ~, yf(y)). This can be referred to
subcase (i-b) in the proof of Proposition 2. Together with the supposition ~~ yf(y) they imply that
(c) holda as a atrict inequality and thus z. ~ y~ z~. It is also known from (i-b) that y~[z„ z,] by the
strict concavity ot gz and z ~ y by the strict monotonicity of g~. By Lemma l, y 1 y and y ~[z„ z,]
imply y 1 z,. Thus z 1 y ~ z,. So t- y. - y~ - min[z,, z] - z~ - z, - z~. The strict concavity and
the other properties of gz imply that for all ki, kz such that ~ G k~ G ki G yf(y) the corresponding
z,(kl), z~(kt), z.(kz) and zi(kz) have the following order:
zt(ki) G z~(kz) G y G z,(k2) G z,(k~) or
t(ki) - [zr(ki) - z~(ki)] ~ [z~(ks) - zi(ks)] - t(ks).
This implies the assertion. 00
We need a technical auxiliary result to proceed:
Lemma A. Suppose that k- g(y) is strictly increasing, concave (convex) and twice continuously
difierentiable in the interval (a, b) and suppose that g~(y) ~ 0 for yE(a, b). Then y- g~(k) exists and
is monotone, convex (concave), and twice continuously diRerentiable with respect to k.
Proof: The existence, monotonicity, and twice continuous differentiability of g~ are assured by the
inverse function theorem; see Flett (1966; Th. 10.9.5). Moreover, we have
~~ 1
6 (k) - gi(g
i(k))
Now, the only task left is to prove the concavity (convexity) conversion. Differentiation o( and1~
application of the chain rule to the foregoing formula for g-~r(k) yields
g'n(k) - - [Br(gg~
which has eign oppositc to that of g~r(g t(k)). This implies convexity (concavity) oi g~(k).
OO
Proof 1 Lemma ,{: We consider three case~ where k-g2(Y )- Y
~'
Caee(i): k E(yf(y), oo). Theo trivially t(k) - 0, since conditioo (c) is violated, thst is, there doe~ not
exiet such interval [yi, y,].
Case(ii): k E (~, yf(y)]. Then, by Lemma 2, t(k) ~ t(k). (This is, óowever, a little more than what
Lemma 2 states. When k- yf(y), t(k) is equal to zero sioce y~ and y, coincide. So we include this
boundary point in the statement.)
Case(iii): k E(0, ~). Since botó g~ and gz are continuous, monotone, and twice di(ïerentiable, by the
inverse function theorem, the following functions are well defined, unique, and twice difierentiable:
hl(k): [~, ~] ~-- (0, Yl with hi~g~(Y)) - Y for all Y E[0, Y],
hz(k): [0, 2] ~-- [0, y] with h2(gz(y)) - y for all y E(0, y].
Furthermore, by Lemma A, 61 is monotone and atrictly concave while h2 is monotone and atrictly
convex. Therefore t(k) - h~(k) - h2(k) is strictly concave in k. Notice that h~r is continuously
decreasing from h~~(0) - oo to h~~(k) - T and h2~ is continuously increasing from hz~(0) - 1 to
6i CY)
h2r(k )- ~. By Lemma 1 we already know y~ y which implies Bzr(y )- f(y ) f'y ir(y ) G 0.
Bz (Y)
Since f(y) - 2, yI(y) G-~ or - yf~(y') ~ ~. Then
gi~(Y )- 1 - flY)- Yf CY) 1 1- 2 t~- 1. Thus
6i~(Y)-
hit(k ) ~ 1 G
6s~(Y)
- h2~(k ). Set
H(k) - hi~(k) - h2~(k).
B is strictly decreasing and continuous with H(0) ~ 0 and H(k ) G 0. By the intermediate value
theorem, there exists a unique k E(0, ~) such that H(~ )- h~~(k) - hzr(~) - 0, that is, t~(k) - 0. By
the stríct conwvity of t(k), such {c will be the unique global maximizer in k E[0, ~].
Cases (i), (ii), and (iii) together imply t(k) 1 t(k) for all k E R~. This completes the proof. 0018
Proof Qj j~QUp,~ 9; Consider .1 ~ 0, y'~ 0 and k10. Then:
OE~AYI(Y';k). AYr(Y':k)) p 9-Ay and YE(yl(Y';k), Yr(Y';k))
qqcAy sod Y~f(Y;Y')1k and Y-(1-f(Y;Y'))Gk
pQ-AY ~d Y~f(AY;Ay')~k and Y~(1-f(AY:AY'))Ck
qq-Ay and AY~f(AY;Ay')~Ak and AY-(1-f(AY;AY'))GAk
p~~f(n;ay')~ak and o-(1-f(o;AY'))~Ak c~
nE~yl(AY';Ak), rr(AY';Ak)1.
Thie shows that io the relevant range, yl(y';k) and yr(y';k) and, conaequently, L(y';k) are
óomogeneoua of degree 1 in (y';k). Moreover, f(AY(Y');AY')-f(Y(Y');Y')-1~2 implies Y(AY')-AY(Y').
FinallY, (A3) implies f(Y:AY')-f(Y~A;Y') and, hence, ~f(Y;AY')-ááyf(Y~A:Y')- There[ore,
f(Y(Y');Y')ty(Y')~~f(y(Y');Y')-o if and only if f(AY(Y');AY')}Ay(Y')~aYf(Ay(r');AY')-0. That
means Y(AY')-AY(Y'). 00
Proof Q{ Prooosition q: With (A3), g~(AY; AY') - AY~(1 - f(AY; AY')) - AY(1 - f(Y; Y')) - Agi(Y: Y'),
i.e. gt ia homogeneous oC degree I in (y; y'). 5imilarly, gz is óomogeneoua of degm 1 in (y; y').
Furthermore h~, the inverse function of g~ inherits the homogeneity of degree 1 in (k; y') , since
Bi(AY;AY') - AB~(Y: Y') - Ak implies h~(Ak; AY') - AY - Ah~(k; Y'). Similarly, it can be
demonstrated that hZ, the inverse of g2, is homogeneous of degree 1 in (k; y'). Therefore, by Euler's
theorem,
z a
0- a hi y, t 8 h~-k.
akay' ak~
With the strict concavity of h„ we then have
a~h~ - a2hi k ~ 0. (9) a~ay' - ak~ Y
Similarly, with the strict convexity of hz,
a~ -- a?hz, k G 0. (10)
akaY' - ak~ Y~
Now t(k;y')-h1(k;y')-h2(k;y') with t(O;y')-0. Clearly, hl and h2 are CZ so that (9) and (10)
imply that a2t(k;y') - a2t(k;y') , 0; hence ([).
ay'ak akay'
From t 0; 0 follows a,t 0; -0 which to ether with a2t(k'y.) 1 0 ielda at k; ( Y')- ay ( Y')- 8 akay. Y ay. ( Y')~ 0
tor all k~ 0, y' ~ 0. Therefore (II).
a a2t(k;Y') Finally, ákt(k(y'); y') - 0 together with aY,ak 1 0 and strict concavity of t in k implies
that k(y') G k(y") for 0 G y'G y", i.e. (111). 0019
proof qj Prooosition ,`1, We divide the proof into three parte:
(i) From Lemma 3 and its proof, We knOW that for any y'~ 0, there exists a unique k(y')E(0, y(y')~2)
such that 1(o;y') G L(m;y') for O~nGmGk(y').
(ii) For 0 G Y' G Y", set rc(y',Y")-k(1)~y'.
Then 0 G k G K(Y',Y") implies 0 G k~y"G k~y'G k(1). Hence by (i),
1.( yk.; 1) G L( Y.: 1).
(iii) Let 0 G y' G y" and 0 G k G K(Y'.Y~~)-
Then by Lemma 4 and (ii),
:-(k;Y~~)~Y" - L( Yk.; 1) G L( y: 1) - L(k:Y')~Y'. O!]
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